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Abstract 
We expect firms that face uncertainty about their access to the financial markets to prioritize 
shorter term investments over longer term ones. Using a high quality panel data set, and a 
difference-in-differences approach to control for demand effects, we study whether this has 
been indeed the case after the sharp deterioration of the financial conditions for firms in the 
European periphery. Specifically, we compare Spanish manufacturing firms which are 
foreign owned (and thus have alternative financing channels) to those which are Spanish 
owned (and thus financially constrained) along a large number of dimensions before and after 
the financial crisis. We show that, allowing for firm fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and for industry specific time effects, firms which are capital constrained 
reduce employment substantially more (by 6%); reduce investment drastically (by 19%); and 
reduce very substantially process innovation and information technology investment; but they 
increase their information technology outsourcing and do not significantly reduce advertising. 
This suggests lack of access to financing is indeed forcing Spanish owned firms to cut future 
oriented investments in order to survive for another day. Our findings are robust to a number 
of alternative approaches to control for unobserved, time varying heterogeneity, e.g. inverse 
propensity score reweighting, or comparing only within multinationals. 
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1 Introduction
When nancial conditions become tight, rms prioritize investments that do not require them to
tie down their nancial resources for long periods of time. For this reason, as rms worry about
their ability to survive through the crunch, we expect these liquidity constrained rms to alter the
composition of investment towards investments that take shorter time to yield output (and liquidity).
Aghion et al (2010) have shown that this mechanism implies that high frequency business cycle
uctuations have long term consequences: Economic growth is likely to decrease as a consequence
of the change in the composition of investment away from long term investments.
In this paper, we study this channel by analyzing the change in the composition of investment that
results from di¤erent levels of uncertainty about rmsaccess to nancing. To do this, we compare
the changes observed in a vector of investment choices before and during the nancial crisis, between
Spanish-owned and foreign-owned companies operating in Spain. This strategy allows us to control
for demand side e¤ects and to focus on the key issue that di¤erentiates these companies over this
period: the lack of access to the deep pockets of a corporate parent based abroad.1
We expect rms which are worried about their access to nance to cut longer term investments
in order to boost short term ones. A simple model, following Aghion et al. (2010), can capture this
mechanism. Firmsinvestment choices fall into two categories: those that have immediate short term
payo¤ (like product advertising), and those that take a while to pay o¤ (like innovation and R&D).
The long term investments involve a risk: in a crunch, they are lost, as the rm must liquidate.
Absent liquidity constraints, rms equalize the value of the marginal dollar on each investment. In
the presence of liquidity shocks, however, there appears a wedge between the value of short and long
term investments, which leads rms to value the immediate payo¤ more. Firms become willing to
cannibalize future prots in order to secure survival. If we were to rank spending by their payo¤
terms, rms would rst cut investment whose consequences are long term and keep undertaking
investments with less delayed payo¤s.
Therefore this "credit crunch mechanism" distorts the investment allocation and implies that
1Recent and compelling evidence shows that Spanish nancial institutions, heavily over-leveraged and dependent
on whole-sale funding, su¤ered a sharp drop in access to credit in 2008/2009 that they transmitted to their customer
companies. Using the extremely detailed credit register data from the Bank of Spain (which contains loan level
data) that also includes loan applications, Jimenez et al (2011) show that higher short-term interest rates reduce the
probability that a loan application is granted more for banks with low capital or liquidity. Specically, a 100-basis-point
increase in the interest rate reduced loan granting by weak banks by 11 percent more than by strong banks.
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rms undertake fewer positive NPV decisions, as they also take into account the survival risk before
undertaking them. Decisions that are longer term, and those that increase the probability of a
bankruptcy, are less likely to be taken.
Our empirical analysis supports this idea: the level and composition of investment by Spanish
owned companies appears sharply a¤ected by nancial constraints, compared to that of their foreign
owned counterparts. Controlling for rm heterogeneity through rm xed e¤ects, and for industry
specic time trends (e.g. industry specic demand shocks) through industry specic time e¤ects,
Spanish owned rms cut investment by 19% more and reduced employment by 6% more after the
nancial crisis in 2007/2008. Spanish rms also increased prices by more, suggesting they were
harvesting customer loyalty at the expense of future market shares. The pattern of the investment
cuts is consistent with the idea that rms reduce their horizon, with insignicant reductions in
advertising, smaller reductions in product innovation (5%) than in process innovation (9%), and
decreases in information technology investments, such as CAD, LAN etc., which drop by around
8-9%. Firms therefore reduce the investments that have a more immediate market impact (i.e.
advertising, product innovation) by less than longer term investments (i.e. R&D, IT investment,
process innovation).
At the same time, rmsreliance on outsourced software application and programming increased
substantially, by 10% and 14%, respectively, presumably because rms were substituting outsourced
labour for these investment cuts. This suggests that, like in our theory, faced with increasing
uncertainty about their survival, rms replace the long term commitment implicit in having an
internal IT labour force with the short term commitment allowed by outsourcing. Spanish owned
rms are trying to rent rather than buy in order to survive the very near future.
To conduct our analysis we rely on a rich data set that includes a wide range of rm choices,
especially investment decisions. This data allows us to explore the consequences of nancing shocks
at the microeconomic level. Our test relies on the hypothesis that, absent the crucial link to the
home country, Spanish rms and foreign rms in the same industry and market that took similar
actions before the crisis would continue to take similar actions after the crisis. The di¤erential
impact of the crisis is then due to their Spanishnessor lack of it.
Specically, the data we rely on is taken from the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales
(ESEE, Survey of business strategies), a rich, high quality, long term panel data set of Spanish
manufacturing rms that has quite precise information on the nancial situation of Spanish rms as
well as on their strategic choices, including variables such as innovation, R&D, capital investment,
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advertising, prices and outsourcing.
Our empirical analysis proceeds in four stages. We rst present our basic specication, comparing
Spanish owned to foreign owned rms, controlling for rm and industry*year xed e¤ects. We then
do a battery of robustness checks: For example, we show that our results are robust to group-specic
time trends and to alternative denitions of treatment and control groups. Moreover, unobserved
heterogeneity does not seem to be responsible for the results. Not only do we have rm xed e¤ects
(thus controlling for initial size) but controlling directly for the time-varying size of rms leaves our
results unchanged, and so does restricting our analysis to multinational companies (both Spanish
and foreign owned). As additional robustness check, we use inverse propensity score reweighting
based on size and export status in order to construct a more comparable treatment and control
group among Spanish and foreign owned rms. Our results are robust to this specication. Next,
we show that we dont see our results in placebo tests, e.g. in non-crisis years, or for the 1993
economic crisis which was characterized by a demand shock rather than a liquidity shock.
Our results are novel. Aghion et al. (2010) test their predictions using a cross-country approach
rather than rm-level evidence like we do, and nd that the impact of shocks on the share of
structural investment is greater in countries with lower levels of nancial development. The nance
and macro literature (e.g. Whited 1992, Carpenter et al. 1994, Hubbard et al. 1995, Bernanke 1996,
Kaplan and Zingales 1997, Lamot 1997, Cleary 1999) generally nds that a rms cash ow position
matters for its investment levels. The general result that constrained rms grow less and invest
less (e.g. in Kaplan and Zingales 1997) points into the same direction as our result. But in this
literature, unlike in our paper, the entire decision vector is aggregated and considered homogeneous
all investments are consolidated into an aggregate one.
Some previous work has shown that indeed the 2008 nancial crisis translated into reduced access
to credit for rms (e.g. Iyer and Peydro 2010). However, the channels through which such constraints
a¤ect rms choices are only beginning to be explored (e.g. Paravisini et al. 2011). The only other
paper we are aware of that attempts, like we do, to study the impact of credit constraints on
a wide range of investment decisions is Campello et al. (Forthcoming), who also study the whole
investment vector. Their ndings are broadly in line with ours: Constrained rms reduce investments
in technology, capital and employment, sell more assets, and postpone or pass on good investment
opportunities. However, rather than using an instrumental variables approach, they simply use a
survey that asks nancial managers whether or not they consider themselves credit constrained.
We think that a considerable drawback of this approach compared to our own is that they rely on
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managers being able and willing to distinguish between supply and demand for credit.
Our empirical approach is inspired by the work of Peek and Rosengreen (2000), who use the
Japanese credit crunch and its implied impact on Japanese banks as an exogenous shock to the loan
supply of US companies connected to these banks. Our strategy is complementary: companies that
are connected, through ownership, to foreign parents are presumably less likely to be a¤ected by
the brutal credit crunch su¤ered by Spanish banks in the aftermath of the crisis.
Our results also contribute to the macro literature. Following the work of Koo (2008) and Eggerts-
son and Krugman (2010) on balance sheet recessions, the literature shows that a crucial mechanism
for the transmission of the nancial constraints to the real economy is the existence of nominal fric-
tions. As Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferreiro and Kiyotaki (2011) show in a model based on Kiyotaki
and Moore (2008), under both fully exible or rigid prices and wages a negative nancing shock re-
sults in a major investment reduction. However, this does not necessarily ensure a recession. When
prices and wages are exible, real interest rates become negative in order to induce consumption
to make up for the investment collapse, dampening the uctuation. In fact, in Del Negro et al.
(2011) the consumption increase under exible prices is large enough such that no drop in GDP
takes place. However, when wages and prices are rigid, this is not possible, as expected deation
raises interest rates and reinforces, rather than dampens, the shock. Indeed, we nd considerable
evidence of wage and price rigidities. Financially constrained rms reduce neither wages nor prices;
instead, they cut labour cost by laying o¤ people (since apparently they arent able to reduce wages
because of strong unions) while they defer investment projects, innovation activities and R&D. Also
they do not reduce prices, but instead raise prices temporarily presumably to obtain cash from
revenues, counting on the habits of their customers. This can again be interpreted as a short term
rather than a long term investment, as such a move presumably reduces market shares in the long
run.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on multinational rms and foreign direct investment.
For example, Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) compare the responses of multinationals and local
rms to currency crises and show that multinationals use the crisis to expand, precisely when the
local rms are constrained.
Finally our analysis allows us to reject the risk shifting behaviour (as in "gambling for resurrec-
tion") by distressed rms (e.g. Eisdorfer 2008) which essentially means that distressed rms invest
more and in worse quality projects than not distressed ones. We nd that rms in our sample reduce
investment, innovation, R&D and employment, and rather than gambling they appear to behave
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extremely cautiously.
We now proceed with our analysis by developing a simple theoretical framework. We then go
on to discuss briey the case of Spain and the data. After doing that, we discuss our empirical
identication strategy and present our results.
2 Theoretical Framework: Short vs. long run investment and liq-
uidity risk
Most theoretical analysis of liquidity constraints aggregates all investment into one single decision
(e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Instead, we assume that a prot maximizing rm must choose
between investments that yield short term payo¤s (kt) and those that yield long term payo¤s (zt).
To capture this trade-o¤we rely on a model that is a simplied version of Aghion et al. (2010). The
key di¢ culty that rms face is that only with some probability t+1 they have enough liquidity to
withstand the wait for the long term payo¤. In other words, in the interim period a liquidity crisis
may simply force the rm to liquidate, with probability 1   t+1. The probability of survival t+1
measures the probability that the entrepreneur will have enough funds to cover the liquidity shock
and is allowed to depend on the levels of short and long term investments. Specically, reallocating
investments from long to short term increases the probability of survival,

@t+1
@kt
  @t+1@zt

> 0. The
choice of how much short run and long run investment to undertake is then given by:
max
kt;zt
Et [f(kt) + t+1(1 + )f(zt)  qtkt   qtzt]
where t+1 measures the probability that the entrepreneur will have enough funds to cover the
liquidity shock,  is the additional productivity of long term investment, and the rest of terms have
their usual meanings.
The rst order conditions are, with respect to k:
Et

f 0(kt)

+ Et

@t+1
@kt
(1 + )f(zt)

= qt
and with respect to z:
Et

t+1(1 + )f
0(zt)

+ Et

@t+1
@zt
(1 + )f(zt)

= qt
or, combining the two equations, we obtain the marginal condition:
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Et

f 0(kt)

= Et

(1   t+1) (1 + )f 0(zt)

where
 t+1 = (1  t+1) +

@t+1
@kt
  @t+1
@zt

f(zt)
f 0(zt)
While in the rst best, absent liquidity shocks, it should be the case that the marginal value of a
dollar is equalized across both types of investments:
Et

f 0(kt)

= Et

(1 + )f 0(zt)

:
Thus the risk that the rm will run out of cash in period t+1 works exactly like a tax on investment
 t+1; and reduces the value of the (more protable a priori) long term investments relative to the
rst best. The rst term of this wedge (1  t+1) captures the probability of failure. The second
term captures the marginal change in this probability as we reallocate investment from long term to
short term. Given that reallocating investments from long term to short term reduces the probabity
of survival, the tax wedge  t+1 > 0. Hence the reallocation away from long term investment
opportunities to short term ones is higher the higher the probability of avoiding bankrupcy by
doing this, the higher the probability of not having enough liquidity next period, and the lower the
marginal productivity of long run investments.
3 Data and empirical strategy
We rely on the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), a panel of Spanish manufacturing
rms. This data has been collected by the Spanish government and the SEPI foundation every year
since 1990. The survey covers around 1,800 Spanish manufacturing rms per year, surveying all rms
with more than 200 employees and a stratied sample of smaller rms. For rms it is compulsory
to respond, and thus the response rate in the survey is 80 to 100 percent. The sample started out
as a representative sample of the population of Spanish manufacturing rms. In order to reduce
the deterioration of representativeness due to non-responding rms, every year new companies are
re-sampled in order to replace exiting ones.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables that are the object of our analysis,
before and after the crisis. The analysis shows that the credit crunch triggered by the nancial crisis
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is reected in the Spanish data: The credit ratio (total credit as a percentage of total assets) of rms
fell by 3 percentage points after the crisis, from 57% to 54%. At the same time, average credit cost
fell by 0.1 percentage points, from 4.38% to 4.28%. However, a closer look at the data shows that
the credit cost didnt fall immediately: Instead, in 2008, they increased sharply to 4.66%. Together
with the observed immediate drop in the credit ratio this suggests that we observe a credit supply
rather than a credit demand shock immediately after the nancial crisis hit. Credit cost fell only
after 2009, a result of the low interest rates stipulated by the European Central Bank in order to
stimulate economic growth. However, the credit ratio stays at the lower level even in those years.
The analysis aims to estimate the e¤ect of the credit squeeze on a range of di¤erent rm deci-
sions, with a focus on investment in technology, but also more broadly investment in capital, R&D,
advertising, etc. Table 1 shows that employment, wages and investment of Spanish rms fell after
the crisis, while process innovation increased and product innovation fell. Also sales and exports of
Spanish rms fell, together with advertising expenses.
The key identication problem we confront is to separate the supply from the demand aspects of
the shock that hit Spain during the nancial crisis, because - although some time later than other
countries - Spain entered a recession in 2008. In order to tackle these challenges to identication,
we apply a di¤erence-in-di¤erences specication where we compare the behaviour of rms that are
a¤ected by the credit crunch to the behaviour of rms that su¤er less from restricted access to
credit, while facing similar demand conditions. We shall experiment with di¤erent treatment and
control groups along various dimensions.
Our main identication strategy consists in comparing stand alone Spanish rms with those that
are part of a foreign multinational. The nancial crisis reduced access to credit sharply in countries
at the European periphery like Spain. However, while those belonging to a foreign group maintain
their access to credit, standalone Spanish rms are at the mercy of the now scarcer bank loans.
The key challenge is that rms in foreign groups and those not in foreign groups are di¤erent along
many dimensions besides access to credit. The aim of all of our analysis is to tackle this challenge.
In order to control for ex ante di¤erences between Spanish and foreign owned rms, we use
two types of xed e¤ects: Firm xed e¤ects allow us to control for unobserved, time invariant
heterogeneity in rmsrisks and demand for credit. In addition, industry*year specic xed e¤ects
allow for industry specic demand shocks that were caused by the crisis. Our main strategy is thus
to run panel regressions, including rm and industry*year xed e¤ects, where we ask: Once the
credit crunch hits, how do the investment decisions of the more constrained (Spanish) rms di¤er
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from those of the foreign multinationals? Our baseline regression is as follows:
yit = 0 + 1(TG  after crisis)it + firm FE + ind  year FE + "it
In all regressions, standard errors are two-way clustered at the rm and industry*year level, to
allow for a correlation of the error within rms across years, and across rms in the same industry
in a given year (e.g. any industry specic shock).
We then present a whole range of robustness checks. First, we try to avoid the endogeneity of the
nationality of ownership by using as treatment the foreign ownership 2 years before the analysis. We
then use the current share of Spanish ownership as treatment intensity, instead of discrete ownership
variable, and also lag it by 2 years. We also allow for di¤erent linear time trends across treatment
and control group.
There is still a concern that foreign owned rms might not be a suitable counterfactual group, as
they tend to be bigger and more internationally oriented than the average Spanish rm. We do three
di¤erent robustness checks to adjust for this di¤erence, which leave our conclusions unchanged. First,
we add a size control to the regressions as we worry that foreign owned rms tend to be larger than
Spanish rms. Second, we pursue the analysis focusing only on multinational groups, both Spanish
and foreign, to make the rms more comparable both in terms of their size and their international
orientation. Third, we use inverse propensity score reweighting based on size and export status in
all pre-crisis years in order to construct a comparable treatment and control group.
Finally, we undertake placebo tests. We conduct our entire analysis on every year in the 2000
decade, and nd that the results turn only signicant in the years of the nancial crisis. We also
compare the current results with the 1993 crisis, which was a demand driven recession, rather than
a credit crunch like during the current crisis. Conrming our hypothesis, we nd di¤erent results
for the demand-driven recession compared to the credit cruch of the recent nancial crisis.
4 Results
4.1 Credit
In Table 2 we start by comparing credit of Spanish and foreign rms. The dependent variable is
the total credit to asset ratio, and the main regressor is an interaction between a Spanish ownership
dummy and a time dummy for the nancial crisis (which is turned on in 2008 and after). Column
(1) controls for industry specic demand conditions using the industrys exports and size as a
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time varying control. Also, rm level xed e¤ects allow us to control for any other time invariant
unobserved rm heterogeneity. In other words, the table answers the question: Comparing two
rms of the same size that are facing the same demand conditions, does the rm that happens to be
Spanish su¤er a signicant drop in credit after the crisis? The answer is unambiguous and highly
signicant: Spanish rms su¤er a drop in credit of around 2.3% (that is 230 basis points) after
the crisis compared to non-Spanish rms. In column (2) we add time xed e¤ects to capture any
common, time varying aspects of the crisis that are not yet captured by industry exports or size,
and the e¤ect is even stronger, 3.1%. Column (3) is our most demanding specication, which allows
for industry specic time e¤ects (and thus absorbs our previous industry specic controls), and the
result is again stronger, with Spanish rms facing a credit drop of 3.8%. This is equivalent to a
6.6% drop in credit relative to the 2007 baseline of 57.8% credit to assets (with standard deviation
of 22.9%) for Spanish rms before the crisis.
Table 3 compares the credit costs to Spanish and foreign rms using the same type of analyses,
and nds no signicant di¤erence in our most demanding specication. The fact that the constraint
is reected in quantities rather than prices is consistent with most observations of price rigidities in
Spain (e.g. large drops in employment and not in wages, large drops in housing sales with no/small
initial drops in house prices). Also, while Spanish rms obtained less credit, the equality of credit
cost shows that the underlying risk of the credit obtained is similar across Spanish and foreign owned
rms.
4.2 Main Results: Impact of the crisis on investments
Table 4 analyzes rmsinvestment decisions. We divide the investment decisions in two categories:
we start with innovation and IT, and then we discuss the rest of the decisions on which we have
data.
Innovation and Information Technology. Column (1) uses capital investment as a dependent
variable. This variable is a¤ected strongest, dropping by around 19% in Spanish rms post crisis
relative to non Spanish rms. Columns (2) and (3) show that Spanish rms decrease product
innovation by 5% and process innovation by even more, 9%. Moreover, the investment in information
technology is substantially reduced, as can be seen in columns (4) to (5): the presence of computer
aided design (CAD) su¤ers a relative drop of 8%, and the presence of local area networks (LAN)
and of exible manufacturing systems is reduced by around 10%. Substituting for these investment
cuts in technology, rms reliance on outsourced sofware programming and application increased
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substantially: by 14% and 10%, respectively.
Employment, Prices and Other choices. Columns (1) to (3) in the second panel of Table 4
show the di¤erential behavior of Spanish owned rms in labour decisions. After the crisis, Spanish
owned rms reduced employment by 5% while increasing overtime by more than half. The result
was a reduction in the total wage bill of around 4%. This indicates that average wages didnt fall,
otherwise the fall in employment would have resulted in a more than proportionate fall in the wage
bill. In column (4) we use a rm specic price index as dependent variable, which we constructed
from survey responses about the change in average sales prices (weighted across the product range).
Price variables are rarely available in rm level data sets, and have therefore been rarely analyzed.
The result is surprising: Credit constrained rms increase their prices by 2.7 percentage points. A
rationale for this behaviour is consistent with our short term vs. long term investment view: Firms
might be able to increase current prots exploiting the habit persistence of their customers at the
cost of reducing future prots from upset customers. Along similar lines, column (5) shows that
rms do not reduce their advertising, presumably again to boost short run sales.
It is not surprising that while wages are not reduced, employment is. Credit constrained rms
in Spain adjust through employment and not wages. While in line with previous overwhelming
evidence on the rigidity of wage bargaining in Spain, this result is if anything more surprising, as
e¢ ciency should dictate any creditors of the rm (including workers) to allow the rm to "borrow"
when bank credit disappears. In other words, such a wage adjustment does not need to lead to any
redistribution in the longer run.
The comparison between advertising and innovation and other investment is illuminating, and
probably in line with the distinction our model makes: while advertising cuts have a short run
impact on consumer choices, innovation only a¤ects rm prots in the medium to long run and thus
can be cut in a credit crunch with little short run (but presumably larger long run) impact. And
while the impact on product innovation is probably quite immediate, process innovation has more
of a long term impact.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the results of some dependent variables: employment,
investment, process innovation and advertising.
Finally, it is reassuring that we dont see a signicant di¤erence in treatment and control group in
terms of sales and exports, as this suggests our strategy to control for demand shocks was successful,
i.e. Spanish and foreign rms are not on di¤erent growth trajectories.
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4.3 Robustness tests
In order to check the robustness of our results, we try di¤erent alternative specications. These are
reported in Table 5, where each row represents a di¤erent specication. Each regression follows our
baseline setup by including a full set of rm xed e¤ects and industry*year xed e¤ects.
The rst row in Table 5 presents our baseline results for comparison purposes. The second row
denes the treatment group as ownership two years before the crisis, in order to allow for the possible
endogeneity of foreign ownership. The third row uses a continuous ownership share instead of the
discrete ownership dummy variable in the baseline specication. In other words, Spanish ownership
becomes the treatment intensity. In the fourth row, we use the same treatment intensity of Spanish
ownership share, but lag it by 2 years again.
The results are basically robust to all these specications, with some weaker results for investment,
CAD, exible systems and employment when we use the lagged ownership variables. However, the
drop in process innovation and LAN, as well as the increases in outsourcing, overtime hours and
prices, and the insignicant e¤ect on advertising persist.
In row 5 we return to our baseline specication, but now allow for a di¤erent linear trend in
treatment and control group to deal with the worry that Spanish and foreign owned rms show
di¤erent trends in their investment behaviour. Here the employment trend is still clear, the invest-
ment drop is of similar magnitude but more imprecise, the product and process innovation e¤ects
are consistent and IT outsourcing becomes smaller. Only our price increase result is reduced. In
row 6 we return to the treatment intensity specication and add the di¤erential linear trends. The
results are similar.
While we have controlled for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, one might worry about
time varying unobserved heterogeneity of Spanish and foreign owned rms (that goes beyond a
group-specic linear trend, which we have already controlled for above). If foreign rms were on a
di¤erent growth trajectory than Spanish rms, this might impact our results of observing di¤erent
raising of credit. The next three rows are concerned with this kind of unobserved, time-varying
heterogeneity.
The simplest way to control for di¤erent growth trajectories is to control for size (i.e. log of
sales), which we do in row 7 (note that the initial size is already absorbed by the rm xed e¤ect).
The downside is that this variable is endogenous, so we have to be careful in interpreting it. But
reassuringly, the results are basically unchanged, except for investment which is still of similar
magnitude, but measured more imprecisely.
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Another dimension of time-varying, unobserved heterogeneity might be di¤erences between com-
panies that operate across countries and those that operate in a single country. Companies that
operate in many countries belong to a corporate group, and this could provide companies with
advantages that go beyond their access to capital. For example they might face a more diversied
demand. Row 8 conducts our analysis only for companies that belong to a corporate group, presum-
ably most of them are multinationals. The results are pretty remarkable. Even though the sample
size drops very substantially (by more than half), the signs are all the same (except for sales, which
is however small and insignicant across all specications), the magnitudes are remarkably constant
(except for employment, which is halved) and they mostly remain signicant.2
Finally, another way to make the control group a more suitable counterfactual for the treatment
group is inverse propensity score reweighting. By reweighting each observation by their (inverse)
propensity score (the "likelihood" that a rm belongs to the treatment group, i.e. is under Spanish
ownership) we aim to reproduce the distribution of Spanish rms more closely by foreign owned
rms, and therefore also match the unobserved time varying heterogeneity better. We construct
propensity scores based on sales and export status of all pre-treatment years. Our results, in row 9,
are also robust to this test. Most of the results are numerically very close to the baseline specication,
suggesting that selection is not a major concern in our analysis.
Our reading of the evidence is that although some results lose signicance in some specications,
overall our results are highly consistent across a large number of di¤erent robustness specications.
4.4 Placebo tests and IV regressions
Table 6 presents an even stronger check: It conducts placebo tests separately for each year (omitting
the baseline year 2000). We expect a statistically signicant e¤ect on the interaction terms only for
the years 2008 to 2010, i.e. after the nancial crisis, and none before.
The placebo tests are in line with our analysis so far, showing signicant results for most variables
only in the post crisis years. The fall in investment is strongest in 2009, and fades out somewhat in
2010. Product innovation is not signicant in any specic year after the crisis, but the coe¢ cient
turned negative in 2008 and all years after. The strongest and most persistent negative e¤ect of
the credit crunch is in process innovation, which is negative and signicant in 2008 and all years
2We have used alternative denitions to proxy for "multinationals" in the data: e.g. by dening multinationals
as those that have foreign a¢ liates, or those who have non-industrial plants in foreign countries, or share holdings
in foreign countries. The results all show the same pattern as our main analysis in terms of signs and magnitudes of
coe¢ cients.
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after. The other technology variables are surveyed only every 4 years (2002, 2006 and 2010), so
the placebo test is just conducted in 2006 and 2010. For all variables but CAD the drop in 2010 is
strong compared to the pre-crisis observation in 2006.
The drop in employment as well as the rise in prices also is strikingly in line with the nancial
crisis and highly persistent over the post-crisis years. At the same time, advertising expenses dont
change signicantly over the whole period. In the bottom rows of the tables we conduct t-tests
of testing for the di¤erence in the treatment e¤ects of 2008, 2009 and 2010 versus 2007 (and 2010
versus 2006 for variables that are surveyed only every 4 years), the last pre-treatment observation.
Again, they conrm the drop in investment, technology, employment and wage bill in the post crisis
years compared to last pre-crisis observation.
How di¤erent is this behaviour of rms from a normalrecession, i.e. a recession not driven by
credit squeeze? In order to address this issue and conrm that the observed e¤ects are really due
to the credit squeeze, we compare the reactions of rms with those in 1993, the last major, demand
driven, Spanish recession before the nancial crisis in 2008.
Table 7 shows that the 2008 crisis is di¤erent: In a normal, demand shock driven, recession,
rms cut neither employment nor IT investment or outsourcing or outsourcing, however, they do
cut product and process innovation. On the other hand, they reduce advertising expenditure and
wages, the price e¤ect is still there. Note that data for capital investment and LAN is not available
in the survey before 1993. From the last two columns it is visible that the 1993 crisis was a demand
driven crisis, as sales and exports fall for the treatment group.
Our main interest lies in understanding how limited access to credit a¤ects the investment be-
haviour of rms. So far we have compared Spanish to foreign owned rms, but our main variable
of interest is actually credit. We can therefore use the credit ratio of Table 2 as a regressor, and
instrument it with Spanish ownership. Basically Table 2 becomes the rst stage of this instrumental
variable regression, while all the tables shown so far correspond to the "reduced form" version. Table
8 implements these IV regressions. The results are obviously in line with the reduced form results,
but allow for a di¤erent interpretation: A reduction of access to credit by 1% in the credit ratio
leads to 9% fall in investment. (Note that the signs are inverted as now the regressions describe
the impact of credit, not lack therof.) Overall, the rst stage is strong, as we have seen in Table
2, but since our sample is somewhat di¤erent for each dependent variable, we report the rst stage
F-statistics separately for each regression. The F-statistics is su¢ ciently large for all regressions
except for investment.
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5 Conclusions
Our analysis has two readings, a macro and a micro one: the macro view concerns Spain and the
crisis in the eurozone, while the micro view focuses on nance and the decisions of rms.
On the macro side, the paper suggests that the breakdown of the single European capital market
is likely to have long term e¤ects on Spanish rms. Spanish rms which are a¤ected by the credit
squeeze cut employment, investment and innovation activities substantially. Credit constraints force
Spanish rms to eat up their future and act as if only the immediate future, tomorrow, mattered.
This is likely to have a long term impact on the Spanish economy, impeding recovery after the
nancial crisis.
On the micro side, our analysis teaches us about what rms do when they are worried about
liquidity. We showed that, as the theory predicts, they prioritize investments that pay o¤ in the
near future, such as advertising and product innovation, over investments that have a more uncertain
or long term payo¤, like process innovation and information technology. We also showed that rms
cut employment, but not wages - probably a Spanish ideosyncracy - and, surprisingly, that rms
increase prices signicantly, probably aiming to harvest customer loyalty on the short run.
All in all, the credit crunch appears to be placing Spanish rms at a severe competitive disad-
vantage relative to their foreign competitors. Moreover, this disadvantage is likely to persist quite
far into the future, given the investment and innovation drops that have long term implications for
economic growth. Future research must quantify the impact of these innovation and investment
decreases on GDP growth.
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APPENDIX 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
Before crisis 
(2000-2007) 
After crisis 
(2008-2010) 
Change 
(t-test) 
    
Credit    
Credit ratio (total credit/total assets) 0.57 0.54 -0.03*** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (-7.92) 
Credit cost1, % 4.38 4.28 -0.10*** 
 (1.19) (1.31) (-2.80) 
    
Innovation and Information Technology    
Investment, mn EUR 5.67 2.72 -2.95 
 (117.4) (161.2) (-1.22) 
Share of firms conducting 0.21 0.19 -0.02*** 
product innovation (0.41) (0.39) (-3.62) 
Share of firms conducting  0.31 0.34 0.03*** 
process innovation (0.46) (0.47) (3.73) 
Share of firms using CAD 0.39 0.41 0.02 
 (0.49) (0.49) (1.39) 
Share of firms using a LAN 0.26 0.34 0.08*** 
 (0.44) (0.47) (6.35) 
Share of firms using flexible  0.26 0.30 0.04*** 
manufacturing systems (0.44) (0.46) (3.83) 
Share of firms outsourcing software  0.65 0.65 0 
programming (fully or partially) (0.48) (0.48) (0) 
Share of firms outsourcing software  0.70 0.70 0 
application (fully or partially) (0.46) (0.46) (0.14) 
    
Employment, Prices and Other choices    
Employment2   260 203 -57*** 
 (780) (682) (-5.19) 
Average overtime hours per employee 11.49 7.95 -3.54*** 
 (27.41) (23.63) (-9.25) 
Wage bill, mn EUR 10.04 9.22 -0.82 
 (32.85) (33.89) (-1.59) 
Price index3 1.05 1.12 0.07*** 
 (0.11) (0.20) (23.07) 
Advertising expenditure, mn EUR 152.61 118.77 -33.84** 
 (967.77) (993.00) (-2.23) 
Sales, mn EUR 74.50 64.37 -10.13** 
 (348.96) (300.70) (-2.08) 
Exports, mn EUR 28.11 24.43 -3.68 
 (218.72) (185.27) (-1.22) 
1 Total cost of a credit (including interest rates, but also other fees) as a percentage of obtained credit.  
2 Employment is the number of employees as of 31 December of a given year. The number includes full time, part 
time, and temporary workers employed by the firm; but not temporary workers  employed by temporary work 
agencies 
19 
 
3 The firm specific price index is 1 in 2000 (or in the first year the firm appears in the survey), and changes each year 
by the average price change of the firm’s products, weighted by the product mix. Comparing the absolute price index 
across firms is not meaningful, our regressions use firm fixed effects and therefore rely on the comparison of the price 
index over time instead. 
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Table 2. Deleveraging of Spanish and foreign firms. 
 
Notes: This table checks whether Spanish owned and foreign owned firms are affected differently 
by the credit squeeze. The dependent variable is credit ratio (total credit divided by total assets, ratio 
between 0 and 1). The main regressor is an interaction term of a Spanish ownership dummy 
(defined by <=50% foreign ownership in same year) and a time dummy variable that indicates the 
financial crisis (=1 in and after 2008). All columns include firm fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) 
control for industry specific demand variables (Spanish exports to EU, Spanish exports to the 
World, domestic value added per industry) to capture industry specific demand shocks of the 
recession driven by the financial crisis. Export data is from the WITS database provided by the 
Worldbank, and Spanish value added per industry is from National Accounts data provided by the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). Column (2) includes year fixed effects to capture 
common time effects. Column (3) includes a full set of industry*year specific fixed effects to 
capture any demand specific effects driven by the crisis (our industry controls are absorbed by these 
fixed effects and therefore omitted). All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and 
industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2000 and 2010. 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) 
Credit ratio (between 0 and 1)    
    
Interaction term (Spanish firms) * (after 2008) -0.0234*** -0.0306*** -0.0378*** 
 (0.00409) (0.01000) (0.0103) 
ln(industry exports to EU) 0.00117 0.0501  
 (0.0351) (0.0360)  
ln(industry exports to World) -0.000615 -0.0339  
 (0.0352) (0.0365)  
ln(industry value added) 0.00678 0.0179  
 (0.0125) (0.0137)  
    
Observations 18,983 18,983 18,983 
R-squared 0.006 0.003 0.002 
Number of firmid 3,051 3,051 3,051 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO 
Ind*Year FE NO NO YES 
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Table 3. Credit cost of Spanish and foreign firms. 
 
Notes: This table compares the credit cost of Spanish owned and foreign owned firms after the 
financial crisis. The dependent variable is the average credit cost (rate is between 0 and 100). The 
main regressor is an interaction term of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign 
ownership in same year) and a time dummy variable that indicates the financial crisis (=1 in and 
after 2008). All columns include firm fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) control for industry 
specific demand variables (Spanish exports to EU, Spanish exports to the World, domestic value 
added per industry) to capture industry specific demand shocks of the recession driven by the 
financial crisis. Export data is from the WITS database provided by the Worldbank, and Spanish 
value added per industry is from National Accounts data provided by the Spanish National Institute 
of Statistics (INE). Column (2) includes year fixed effects to capture common time effects. Column 
(3) includes a full set of industry*year specific fixed effects to capture any demand specific effects 
driven by the crisis (our industry controls are absorbed by these fixed effects and therefore omitted). 
All standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2000 and 2010. 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: (1) (2) (3) 
Credit cost (from 0 to 100) in %    
    
Interaction term (Spanish firms) * (after 2008) 0.113 -0.0830 -0.0911 
 (0.0742) (0.222) (0.200) 
ln(industry exports to EU) -1.600** -0.537  
 (0.670) (0.450)  
ln(industry exports to World) 1.306** 0.665  
 (0.656) (0.439)  
ln(industry value added) -0.0773 0.0140  
 (0.187) (0.180)  
    
Observations 4,613 4,613 4,613 
R-squared 0.015 0.002 0.000 
Number of firmid 1,156 1,156 1,156 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO 
Ind*Year FE NO NO YES 
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Table 4. Investment vector of Spanish and foreign firms. 
 
Notes: This table compares a variety of investment decisions of Spanish owned and Foreign owned 
firms after the financial crisis. The dependent variable is stated in the head of each column. The 
main regressor is an interaction term of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign 
ownership in same year) and a time dummy variable that indicates the financial crisis (=1 in and 
after 2008). All columns include firm fixed effects and a full set of industry*year specific fixed 
effects to capture any demand specific effects driven by the crisis. All standard errors are two-way 
clustered at the firm and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are 
between 2000 and 2010. 
 
 
3A. Innovation and Information Technology 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(invest 
ment) 
Product 
innovation 
dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD dummy LAN dummy Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software 
programming 
outsource  
dummy 
Software 
application 
outsource  
dummy 
         
Interaction term (Spanish firms) -0.187* -0.053** -0.088*** -0.076** -0.096** -0.11** 0.140*** 0.104** 
* (after 2008) (0.112) (0.0227) (0.0251) (0.0384) (0.0439) (0.0429) (0.0421) (0.0404) 
         
Observations 12,351 19,348 19,612 4,264 4,264 4,264 4,256 4,256 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Number of firmid 2,432 3,093 3,112 1,733 1,733 1,733 1,729 1,729 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
3B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average  
overtime 
hours) 
ln(wagebill) Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
ln(sales) ln(exports) 
        
Interaction term (Spanish firms)  -0.056*** 0.630* -0.038* 0.0271*** -0.041 -0.0500 -0.0602 
* (after 2008) (0.0215) (0.360) (0.0208) (0.00966) (0.0606) (0.0316) (0.0578) 
        
Observations 19,612 19,558 19,609 19,592 13,454 19,609 12,405 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 3,104 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Number of firmid 3,112 3,106 3,111 3,104 2,378 3,111 2,053 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Figure 1. Spanish owned versus foreign owned firms. 
 
Notes: These graphs plot the difference of the average dependent variable (in title) between Spanish 
firms (defined by <=50% foreign ownership in same year) and foreign owned firms (defined by 
>50% foreign ownership in same year) over years, after controlling for industry specific year 
effects.  
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   Treatment group: Spanish firms (defined by <=50% foreign ownership 
in same year)  
 – –  Control group: Foreign owned firms (defined by >50% foreign 
ownership in same year) 
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Table 5. Robustness checks 
 
Notes: This table conducts a variety of robustness checks to our main specification as in the last 
table. The dependent variable is stated in the head of each column. Each row represents a different 
regression. Each regression includes a full set of firm fixed effects and industry*year fixed effects, 
just as in the baseline specification. Standard errors are two-way clustered at firm level and 
industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions in the different rows are: 
Baseline: Same as in table X. Treatment group: Spanish firms (defined by 
<=50% foreign ownership in same year); control group: foreign 
owned firms (defined by >50% foreign ownership in same year) 
2.  The treatment and control groups are defined based on foreign 
ownership 2 years before  
3.  The current share of Spanish ownership is used as treatment 
intensity  
4.  The treatment intensity is based on the Spanish ownership share 2 
years prior  
5.  We return to our baseline specification, but now allow for a 
different linear trends in treatment and control group 
6.  We return to the treatment intensity specification (specification 3), 
but now allow for a different linear trends in treatment and 
control group 
7.  Add ln(sales) as control; use current share of Spanish ownership 
as treatment intensity 
8. Use only multinationals defined as companies that belong to a 
corporate group; use current share of Spanish ownership as 
treatment intensity 
9. Inverse propensity score reweighting method, based on average 
sales and exporter status in pre-treatment years (2000 to 2007) 
 
5A. Innovation and Information Technology 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(invest 
ment) 
Product 
innovation 
dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD 
dummy 
LAN 
dummy 
Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software 
programming  
outsource  
dummy 
Software 
application  
outsource 
dummy 
          
Baseline:  (Spanish firms)  -0.187* -0.0535** -0.0885*** -0.0759** -0.0959** -0.109** 0.140*** 0.104** 
 * (after 2008) (0.112) (0.0227) (0.0251) (0.0384) (0.0439) (0.0429) (0.0421) (0.0404) 
2.  (Spanish firms 2 yrs ago) -0.132 -0.0277 -0.0781*** -0.0512 -0.112** -0.0273 0.146*** 0.129*** 
 * (after 2008) (0.123) (0.0228) (0.0280) (0.0472) (0.0526) (0.0501) (0.0530) (0.0433) 
3. (Spanish ownership)  -0.204* -0.0531** -0.0866*** -0.0798** -0.0919** -0.119*** 0.129*** 0.103** 
 * (after 2008) (0.115) (0.0234) (0.0257) (0.0393) (0.0452) (0.0413) (0.0427) (0.0408) 
4. (Spanish ownership 2 yrs ago)  -0.175 -0.0275 -0.0768*** -0.0447 -0.120** -0.0489 0.134** 0.115*** 
 * (after 2008) (0.126) (0.0232) (0.0285) (0.0473) (0.0548) (0.0515) (0.0542) (0.0446) 
5.  (Spanish firms)  -0.214 -0.0776*** -0.0830*** -0.181*** -0.0421 -0.0899 0.245*** 0.0728 
 * (after 2008) (0.136) (0.0245) (0.0301) (0.0585) (0.0658) (0.0723) (0.0672) (0.0621) 
6.  (Spanish ownership)  -0.239* -0.0745*** -0.0770** -0.183*** -0.0296 -0.111 0.206*** 0.0675 
 * (after 2008) (0.139) (0.0259) (0.0307) (0.0582) (0.0653) (0.0718) (0.0653) (0.0604) 
7. (Spanish ownership)  -0.160 -0.0516** -0.0835*** -0.0747* -0.0867* -0.112*** 0.129*** 0.105** 
 * (after 2008) (0.112) (0.0233) (0.0255) (0.0394) (0.0455) (0.0418) (0.0427) (0.0408) 
8. (Spanish ownership)  -0.142 -0.0595** -0.0428 -0.0770* -0.0776 -0.0937** 0.148*** 0.125** 
 * (after 2008) (0.125) (0.0271) (0.0293) (0.0439) (0.0551) (0.0472) (0.0455) (0.0509) 
9. (Spanish firms)  -0.107 -0.0537** -0.0931*** -0.110** -0.0205 -0.0901* 0.131** 0.149** 
 * (after 2008) (0.189) (0.0254) (0.0303) (0.0538) (0.0390) (0.0503) (0.0569) (0.0584) 
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5B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average  
overtime hours)
ln(wage 
bill) 
Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
ln(sales) ln(exports)
         
Baseline:  (Spanish firms)  -0.0561*** 0.630* -0.0377* 0.0271*** -0.0415 -0.0500 -0.0602 
 * (after 2008) (0.0215) (0.360) (0.0208) (0.00966) (0.0606) (0.0316) (0.0578) 
2.  (Spanish firms 2 yrs ago) -0.0281 1.110*** -0.0189 0.02331** -0.0412 -0.0201 0.00618 
 * (after 2008) (0.0233) (0.407) (0.0219) (0.01055) (0.0655) (0.0351) (0.0616) 
3. (Spanish ownership)  -0.0624*** 0.681* -0.0418** 0.02765*** -0.0506 -0.0533 -0.0577 
 * (after 2008) (0.0219) (0.368) (0.0213) (0.00993) (0.0612) (0.0326) (0.0597) 
4. (Spanish ownership 2 yrs ago)  -0.0366 1.177*** -0.0225 0.02422** -0.0573 -0.0244 0.00383 
 * (after 2008) (0.0237) (0.409) (0.0226) (0.01094) (0.0662) (0.0366) (0.0639) 
5.  (Spanish firms)  -0.0402** 0.664 -0.0219 0.01147 0.0195 -0.0102 -0.0260 
 * (after 2008) (0.0201) (0.480) (0.0212) (0.00826) (0.0633) (0.0294) (0.0726) 
6.  (Spanish ownership)  -0.0512** 0.742 -0.0292 0.01217 0.00172 -0.0165 -0.0202 
 * (after 2008) (0.0211) (0.473) (0.0218) (0.00894) (0.0615) (0.0307) (0.0729) 
7. (Spanish ownership)  -0.0376** 0.721** -0.0169 0.0290*** 0.0133 n/a -0.0428 
 * (after 2008) (0.0173) (0.367) (0.0154) (0.00989) (0.0554) n/a (0.0547) 
8. (Spanish ownership)  -0.0260 0.392 -0.0136 0.0296** -0.00803 0.0290 -0.0223 
 * (after 2008) (0.0252) (0.447) (0.0237) (0.0121) (0.0746) (0.0363) (0.0677) 
9. (Spanish firms)  -0.0451 1.259* -0.0326 0.0296*** -0.194 0.0337 -0.0400 
 * (after 2008) (0.0339) (0.688) (0.0355) (0.0112) (0.119) (0.0696) (0.103) 
 
 
26 
 
 Table 6. Placebo tests 
 
Notes: This table compares a variety of investment decisions of Spanish and Foreign firms in every 
year between 2001 and 2010. The dependent variable is stated in the head of each column. The 
regressors are interaction terms of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign 
ownership in same year) and a dummy variable that indicates the specified year. All columns 
include full sets of firm fixed effects and industry*year fixed effects. All standard errors are two-
way clustered at firm level and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations 
are between 2000 and 2010. In the rows at the bottom of the table we conduct four different F-tests: 
testing the equality of the coefficient on the 2007 interaction term and the coefficient on the 2008, 
2009 and 2010 interaction terms, in order to check whether the financial crisis terms are 
significantly different from the pre-crisis year 2007. We also report the according p-values. The 
dependent variables in columns (4) to (8) are available only every four years, i.e. years 2002, 2006 
and 2010. 
 
6A. Innovation and Information Technology 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(invest 
ment) 
Product 
innovation 
dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD dummy LAN dummy Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software 
programmin
g  
outsource  
dummy 
Software 
application 
outsource 
dummy 
         
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00716 -0.0113 0.0192      
firms) * (year=2001) (0.0963) (0.0289) (0.0341)      
Interaction term (Spanish  0.0764 -0.00907 0.0245      
firms) * (year=2002) (0.142) (0.0297) (0.0310)      
Interaction term (Spanish  0.167 0.0247 0.0228      
firms) * (year=2003) (0.164) (0.0290) (0.0398)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00986 0.0209 0.0118      
firms) * (year=2004) (0.101) (0.0329) (0.0385)      
Interaction term (Spanish  0.0515 0.0559* 0.0109      
firms) * (year=2005) (0.156) (0.0297) (0.0375)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.116 0.00975 -0.0346 0.0655* -0.0433 -0.0138 -0.0639 0.0328 
firms) * (year=2006) (0.127) (0.0286) (0.0321) (0.0341) (0.0418) (0.0431) (0.0441) (0.0380) 
Interaction term (Spanish  0.117 0.0280 0.0210      
firms) * (year=2007) (0.131) (0.0297) (0.0383)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.123 -0.0285 -0.0775**      
firms) * (year=2008) (0.134) (0.0295) (0.0352)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.322** -0.0347 -0.0713*      
firms) * (year=2009) (0.161) (0.0321) (0.0401)      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00426 -0.0572 -0.104*** -0.0408 -0.119** -0.117** 0.106** 0.121*** 
firms) * (year=2010) (0.198) (0.0379) (0.0390) (0.0426) (0.0511) (0.0494) (0.0508) (0.0460) 
         
Observations 12,351 19,348 19,612 4,265 4,265 4,265 4,257 4,257 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Number of firmid 2,432 3,093 3,112 1,733 1,733 1,733 1,729 1,729 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test 2007=2008 coef 2.457 9.741 11.72      
p-value 0.563 0.00904 0.00121      
F-test 2007=2009 coef 5.293 6.814 6.216      
p-value 0.0214 0.00180 0.0127      
F-test 2007=2010 coef 0.334 6.916 10.48      
p-value 0.117 0.00854 0.000618      
F-test 2006=2010 coef    6.699 2.808 4.891 14.52 4.200 
p-value    0.00965 0.0938 0.0270 0.000138 0.0404 
 
27 
 
6B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average 
overtime 
hours) 
ln(wage 
bill) 
Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
      
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00237 -0.465 0.00132 -0.0229*** 0.0211 
firms) * (year=2001) (0.0157) (0.388) (0.0145) (0.0066) (0.0345) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00481 -0.702 0.00824 -0.014** 0.104** 
firms) * (year=2002) (0.0154) (0.442) (0.0153) (0.0057) (0.0480) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0135 -0.600 -0.00668 -0.0084 0.0165 
firms) * (year=2003) (0.0145) (0.394) (0.0166) (0.0057) (0.0584) 
Interaction term (Spanish  0.00459 -0.630 0.00469 0.0012 0.0364 
firms) * (year=2004) (0.0191) (0.424) (0.0185) (0.0063) (0.0541) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0337 -0.466 -0.0312 0.0019 -0.0641 
firms) * (year=2005) (0.0222) (0.435) (0.0214) (0.0076) (0.0479) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0211 0.0873 -0.0100 0.0087 -0.0271 
firms) * (year=2006) (0.0215) (0.438) (0.0205) (0.0096) (0.0687) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.00901 -0.0182 -0.00427 0.0188 -0.113 
firms) * (year=2007) (0.0269) (0.514) (0.0276) (0.0124) (0.0742) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0535** 0.234 -0.00776 0.0204* -0.0645 
firms) * (year=2008) (0.0269) (0.487) (0.0265) (0.0122) (0.0769) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0759*** 0.777 -0.0648** 0.0295** -0.0747 
firms) * (year=2009) (0.0294) (0.563) (0.0289) (0.0119) (0.0777) 
Interaction term (Spanish  -0.0703** 0.211 -0.0628** 0.0379*** -0.0336 
firms) * (year=2010) (0.0322) (0.462) (0.0315) (0.0138) (0.104) 
      
Observations 19,612 19,558 19,609 19,592 13,454 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 
Number of firmid 3,112 3,106 3,111 3,104 2,378 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test 2007=2008 coef 6.582 0.286 0.0289 0.0345 0.587 
p-value 0.0103 0.171 0.865 0.102 0.599 
F-test 2007=2009 coef 10.93 1.873 7.325 1.296 0.277 
p-value 0.000944 0.593 0.00680 0.853 0.437 
F-test 2007=2010 coef 5.760 0.191 4.527 2.676 0.603 
p-value 0.0164 0.662 0.0334 0.255 0.444 
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Table 7. Comparison with the last economic crisis: 1993 
 
Notes: This table compares a variety of investment decisions of Spanish and Foreign firms after the 
economic crisis in 1993. The specification is analogous to our “baseline specification” in table 3. 
The dependent variable is stated in the head of each column. The main regressor is an interaction 
term of a Spanish ownership dummy (defined by <=50% foreign ownership in same year) and a 
dummy variable that indicates the economic crisis in 1993 (=1 in and after 1993). All columns 
include full sets of firm fixed effects and industry*year fixed effects. All standard errors are two-
way clustered at firm level and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations 
are between 1990 and 1995. Note, the variables investment and LAN dummy were not available 
before 1993.   
 
7A. Innovation and Information Technology 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Product 
innovation 
Dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD 
dummy 
Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software  
programming  
outsource  
dummy 
Software  
application 
outsource  
dummy 
       
Interaction term (Spanish firms)  -0.0481** -0.0623*** 0.0219 0.00884 -0.0496 0.00227 
* (after 1993) (0.0235) (0.0230) (0.0333) (0.0416) (0.0410) (0.0406) 
       
Observations 11,026 11,328 2,824 2,826 2,920 2,920 
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Number of firmid 2,286 2,301 1,412 1,413 1,460 1,460 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
7B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average 
overtime 
hours) 
ln(wage 
bill) 
Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
ln(sales) ln(exports) 
        
Interaction term (Spanish firms)  0.0423** -0.515 -0.0281 0.0164** -0.0918 -0.113*** -0.166** 
* (after 1993) (0.0174) (0.367) (0.0174) (0.00790) (0.0584) (0.0233) (0.0655) 
        
Observations 11,338 9,177 11,254 11,307 7,215 11,265 5,879 
Partial R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 
Number of firmid 2,301 2,160 2,292 2,290 1,691 2,293 1,287 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 8. Using Spanish ownership as instrument for credit crunch 
 
Notes: This table shows 2SLS regressions of a dependent variable (stated in the head of each 
column) on  the main regressor credit (total credit in percent of assets), using the interaction of 
Spanish ownership share with a dummy indicating the crisis (=1 in 2008, 2009 and 2010) as 
instrument for credit. The first stage of these regressions we have already shown in Table 1 before, 
however, we report the F-statistics of the first stage in the last row.  All columns include full sets of 
firm fixed effects and industry*year fixed effects. All standard errors are two-way clustered at firm 
level and industry*year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are between 2000 and 
2010. 
 
 
 
8A. Innovation and Information Technology 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ln(invest 
ment) 
Product 
innovation 
dummy 
Process  
innovation  
dummy 
CAD  
dummy 
LAN  
dummy 
Flexible  
systems  
dummy 
Software  
programming  
outsource  
dummy 
Software  
application 
outsource  
dummy 
         
Credit in % of assets 8.988 1.280** 2.334*** 2.275* 2.497* 3.419** -2.953** -2.385* 
(between 0 and 1) (6.766) (0.628) (0.864) (1.330) (1.316) (1.590) (1.337) (1.301) 
         
Observations 12,058 18,718 18,983 4,087 4,087 4,087 4,079 4,079 
Partial R-squared -0.318 -0.252 -0.484 -0.661 -0.799 -1.335 -0.783 -0.531 
Number of firmid 2,389 3,030 3,051 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,665 1,665 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
First stage 3.251 15.19*** 14.59*** 9.001*** 9.001*** 9.001*** 9.169*** 9.043*** 
(p-velue) (0.0728) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0039) 
 
8B. Employment, Prices and Other choices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES ln(employ 
ment) 
ln(average  
overtime 
hours) 
ln(wagebill) Price index 
(0 to 1) 
ln(adver 
tising) 
ln(sales) ln(exports) 
        
Credit in % of assets 1.709** -16.84* 1.159** -0.639** 0.817 1.615* 2.451 
(between 0 and 1) (0.678) (10.00) (0.591) (0.2949) (1.407) (0.924) (1.904) 
        
Observations 18,983 18,931 18,983 18,965 13,167 18,983 12,099 
Partial R-squared -0.622 -0.227 -0.306 -0.668 -0.020 -0.324 -0.096 
Number of firmid 3,051 3,045 3,051 3,044 2,334 3,051 2,028 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ind*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
First stage 14.59*** 14.99*** 14.59*** 14.62*** 11.19*** 14.59*** 8.892*** 
(p-value) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0032) 
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